water park

Design: workload identity and federation trust (SPIFFE seam)

Surveyed 2026-07-28. Informs personas item 4 and the threat-model credential tiers.

The split

water park manages authorization objects; SPIFFE/SPIRE manages authentication — how a workload proves it is tickets-api without a static key. Complementary, with one seam: federation trust config. JWT-SVID through an OIDC provider + role trust policy, X.509-SVID through IAM Roles Anywhere, GCP WIF pools, Azure federated credentials — every one a declarable cloud resource, and among the most security-critical in an org: a loose trust condition is a standing backdoor. They belong in the estate, lint-checked and drift-watched.

One mechanism class, three issuers

CI OIDC, Kubernetes service-account tokens, and SPIRE SVIDs are the same thing: federated short-lived credentials whose trust config is code. src/trust/ covers all three with one typed form — issuer, subject condition, target role/pool. The threat model’s own CI credentials are an instance of this layer, not a special case.

The sandbox exception: untrusted workloads

The mechanism assumes the workload is trusted code — only then does “the pod can read the token” imply “the token names the pod.” Agent sandboxes running untrusted code break that premise: assume everything readable inside is exfiltrated, and a projected SA token is a bearer JWT that federates from any IP until expiry. Short TTLs shrink the replay window; they don’t close it.

So decision 15: an untrusted sandbox is never a federation subject. It mounts no SA token and holds no cloud credentials. Capabilities arrive as a conversation-scoped token for a verb API served by trusted code outside the boundary, which federates normally through this layer. Residual hardening on the verb service’s anchor: source-IP / VPC-endpoint conditions (a replayed credential fails at STS), per-conversation sts:SourceIdentity for attribution, paging on role use from an unexpected origin. Sender-constrained tokens (WIMSE) would close bearer replay properly; cloud STS doesn’t support them — a watch item, not a dependency.

Division of labor: the runtime (Fountain) enforces the boundary — isolation, token plumbing, egress; water park declares the policy — the verb service’s trust anchor, its role, and the lint on both.

The cross-cloud upside

For workloads, SPIFFE offers the universal principal name cross-cloud personas otherwise lack: spiffe://waterpark.io/site/publisher is one identity every cloud’s federation config can reference. A workload leaf file carries an optional SPIFFE ID; each leg compiles to that cloud’s trust for the same ID. The workload half of OrgPrincipal goes cross-cloud without inventing an equivalence; the human half remains the hard part of the equivalence unknown.

Boundary: never operate the issuer

Running SPIRE well is its own product (hence SPIRL/Defakto, Teleport, Tetrate, Aembit). water park is BYO-issuer: k8s SA tokens and CI OIDC cover most orgs with zero new infrastructure; SPIRE or a commercial vendor covers heterogeneous fleets; the declared trust anchor is the same form either way. Ecosystem is healthy (active repos, hardened helm chart, IETF WIMSE). Scope line: Athenz bundles authn and policy — the one adjacent tool that overlaps rather than complements; a docs sentence, not an integration.

To decide

  1. The src/trust/ typed form — one form across the three issuer classes, per-cloud serialization.
  2. Lint strictness: no wildcard SPIFFE path or sub claim, pinned issuer/audience; network conditions mandatory for anchors whose consumer sits adjacent to an untrusted sandbox.
  3. Whether the SPIFFE ID lives on the principal or in the trust layer. Lean: on the principal — it is the principal’s cross-cloud name.
  4. Settled. OIDC is the documented AWS default. Workloads federate through aws_iam_openid_connect_provider entries in access/envs/prod, account scoped beside the role that trusts it, issuer and audience pinned, no wildcard sub claim. Roles Anywhere gets one paragraph as the option for a fleet with an existing PKI. The rotation check for the few static secrets that remain runs on the watch’s weekday schedule, so one cron drives both (decision 39, decision 54). access/identity/ holds no trust anchor at all, because an anchor is account scoped and belongs beside the role that trusts it (decision 59).